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Civil Code Section 5120.110(c):
California's New Approach to
Postseparation Obligations

S. Brett Sutton* and Lee A. Miller'

INTRODUCTION

After ten years of marriage, Harold and Wilma decided to
separate. Wilma had been a housewife throughout the marriage,
and had few funds of her own on the date of separation. She
quickly obtained a part-time job paying minimum wage. Three
months into the separation, and prior to final dissolution of her
marriage to Harold, Wilma purchased a California Lottery ticket for
$1.00. The ticket was purchased with Wilma's postseparation
earnings. Two days later, she was notified that she had won
$500,000.
Harold immediately brought suit against Wilma claiming that
Wilma's lottery winnings constituted community property in which
he had a one-half interest. Harold argued that since the marriage
had not yet been finally dissolved, the lottery winnings were earned
"during marriage" and were therefore community property. The
court found to the contrary and awarded the proceeds of the ticket
to Wilma as her separate property, reasoning that the ticket was
purchased with funds earned by Wilma after separation.
After the conclusion of Harold's lawsuit, but still prior to
dissolution, Wilma decided to take her lottery winnings to Las
Vegas. This time, however, lady luck was not on her side. Not only
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did Wilma lose all the money she had won on the California
Lottery, but she also incurred enormous gambling debts. Wilma's
creditors sought to satisfy the gambling debts from Harold's
community assets in addition to Wilma's meager assets.
Surprisingly, the court ruled in favor of Wilma's creditors, allowing
them to take both Wilma's and Harold's community property
despite the fact that the debts were incurred solely by Wilma after
she and Harold had separated.
The above hypothetical illustrates a potential inequity which
existed under California law prior to the enactment of Civil Code
section 5120.110(c) on January 1, 1990.1 Prior to January 1, 1990,
California law permitted a separated spouse, such as Wilma, to
retain postseparation earnings and accumulations acquired as his or
her separate property,2 but rendered the property of both spouses
liable for obligations incurred by either spouse during the same
postseparation period.3 Thus, prior to enactment of section
5120.110(c), California operated under a statutory system whereby
the nondebtor spouse's (e.g. Harold's) community property was
forced to bear the risks of the debtor spouse's postseparation

1.
CAL. CIV. CODE § 5120.110(c) (West Supp. 1991). Section 5120.110(c) states: "'[djuring
marriage' shall not include the period during which the spouses are living separate and apart prior
to a judgment for dissolution of marriage or a judgment for legal separation." Id. Prior to the advent
of section 5120.110(c) the laws in California pertaining to the separation period were inconsistent,
despite the fact that -marriage" continues throughout separation. Under California law, marriage
continues until the happening of either (1) The death of one of the parties; (2) a court judgment
decreeing a dissolution of the marriage; or (3) a judgment of nullity. CAL. CIV. CODE § 4350 (West
1983). Thus, in California, it is not sufficient for a dissolution of marriage that a couple merely
separate and decide to live apart.
2.
CAL. CIV. CODE § 5118 (West 1985). Section 5118 states: "'t~he earnings and
accumulations of a spouse and the minor children living with, or in the custody of, the spouse, while
living separate and apart from the other spouse, are the separate property of the spouse." Id.
3. CAL. Civ. CoDE § 5120.110(a) (West Supp. 1991). Civil Code section 5120.110 provides
in pertinent part:
(a) Except as otherwise expressly provided by statute, the community property is liable
for a debt incurred by either spouse before or during marriage,regardless which spouse
has the management and control of the property and regardless whether one or both
spouses are parties to the debt or to a judgment for the debt.
Id. (Emphasis added). Subdivision (a) of section 5120.110 continues the substance of former section
5116 which stated: "[T]he property of the community is liable for the contracts of either spouse
which are made after marriage prior to or on or after January 1, 1975." 1984 Cal. Stat. ch. 1671, sec.
7 at 6019 (repealing CAL. CIV. CODE § 5116).
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liability, yet the nondebtor spouse was precluded from enjoying any
benefits or profits derived from postseparation risks.
The unfairness inherent in the prior system was brought to the
California Legislature's attention in July of 1988. 4 State Senator
Phillip Isenberg introduced legislation addressing the aboveillustrated inequities by clarifying Civil Code section 5120.110,
which renders the community liable for debts incurred "during
marriage." Senator Isenberg drafted section 5120.110 consistently
with Civil Code section 5118, an interrelated law which
characterizes the postseparation earnings and accumulations of a
separated spouse as that spouse's separate property. 5 Without
immediate legislative clarification, the prior law would have
provided an opportunity for serious mischief by a spouse who,
perhaps intentionally, incurred substantial postseparation debts
chargeable against the community assets of both spouses.
Reacting quickly to the plea, the California Legislature
determined that the best way to resolve the apparent inequities was
to amend former Civil Code section 5120.110 so that the
community is absolved of liability for the other spouse's
postseparation debts.6 The legislature did so in the form of
A letter written by Attorney Edward Huntington of the San Diego County Bar Association
4.
in response to a 1988 Bankruptcy Court decision stressed the need for legislative clarification. See
Letter from Edward B. Huntington to the Honorable Phillip Isenberg (July 22, 1988) (discussing the
unfairness inherent in the Bankruptcy Court's decision) (copy on file at the Pacific Law Journal). See
also In re McCoy, 90 Bankr. 448, 449-50 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 1988) (discussing former Civil Code §
1 Bankr. 276 (B.A.P. 1990)). The appellate panel held that the amended
5120.110) (reversed by II
version of section 5120.110 was applicable to the case at the appellate level. Id. at 281.
5. CAL. CIV. CODE § 5118 (West 1983). Huntington charged the Bankruptcy Court with
interpreting the term "during marriage" too literally, making all community property liable for debts
incurred during separation. See Letter from Edward B. Huntington to the Honorable Phillip Isenberg,
supra note 4. Huntington also argued that the Bankruptcy Court decision was contrary to the way
in which family law is applied in state court. Id. According to Huntington, most state courts would
not allow one party to pay for the debts of the other party incurred after separation nor would state
court allow those debts to be a charge against the other person's property. Id. To avoid decisions such
as that in McCoy, 90 Bankr. 448, Huntington proposed a legislative clarification stating that "[f]or
purposes of this section [Section 5120.110] 'during marriage' shall not include the postseparation
period prior to the entry of judgment." Id.
6. In 1989, the California Legislature enacted Assembly Bill 1907. The Bill, authorized by
the Assembly Committee on Judiciary, sought to make three important changes to the Family Law
Act, one of which was an amendment to California Civil Code § 5120.110. The Bill passed both
houses unanimously and had no opposition. The Bill was signed into law by Governor George
Deukrejian on October 1, 1989.
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Assembly Bill 1907, which clarified that the term "during
marriage," as used in section 5120.110(a),7 does not include the
period in which the spouses are living "separate and apart" prior
to a judgment for dissolution of the marriage or a judgment for
legal separation.' The apparent legislative intent of this amendment
was to bring California's treatment of spousal debts during the
postseparation period into symmetry with other laws pertaining to
postseparation earnings and accumulations. However, the legislature
may have failed to achieve this goal.
The purpose of this Article is two-fold: (1) To inform separated
spouses, their attorneys, and their creditors of their rights and
obligations under California law; and (2) to analyze whether the
amendment to Civil Code section 5120.110 goes too far in light of
the intended results. In furtherance of these goals, Part I of this
Article briefly examines events leading up to the legislative
clarification, including a bankruptcy court decision without which
legislative clarification in the area of spousal debts might not have
occurred.9 Part H of this Article analyzes the effect of the 1990
amendment on debts incurred both prior and subsequent to the
amendment's effective date.'0 Specifically, inquiry will be made
as to the potential retroactive application of the amendment and the
due process issues created by such an application." Part III of this
Article restates the results intended by the legislative clarification
and discusses why the legislature may have failed to bring about
such intended results. 2 Finally, part IV of this Article proposes
7.
See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
8. CAL. CIV. CODE § 5120.1 10(c) (West Supp. 1991). Living "separate and apart" does not
refer to the condition where spouses are temporarily living in different places because of travel or
economic circumstances, but to the situation where they live separate and apart from each other with
no present intention of reconciliation. See In re Marriage of Baragry, 73 Cal. App. 3d 444, 448, 140
Cal. Rptr. 779, 781 (1977) (stating that the phrase "living separate and apart" refers to the condition
when spouses have come to a parting of the ways with no present intention of resuming marital
relations"). The fact that a husband and wife may live in separate residences is not determinative of
whether they are actually living separate and apart. See also In re Marriage of Marsden, 130 Cal.
App. 3d 426, 434, 181 Cal. Rptr. 910, 914 (1982) (holding that a couple is "'living separate and
apart" if the parties' conduct evidences a complete and final break in the marital relationship).
9.
See infra notes 14-36 and accompanying text.
10. See infra notes 37-101 and accompanying text.
11. See infra notes 43-101 and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 102-128 and accompanying text.
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a further amendment to the law -- one which would create the
necessary symmetry to bring about equitable results in the area of
postseparation obligations."
I. THE IPETUS FOR CALORNIA CWvIL CODE
SECTION 5120.110(c): AN UNFAiR BANKRUPTCY
COURT DECISION

California Civil Code section 5120.110(c) is primarily a
response to In re McCoy, 4 a 1988 Bankruptcy Court decision. In
McCoy, the debtor and his wife ("the McCoys"), separated after
approximately sixteen years of marriage. I" Soon thereafter, the
McCoys filed a petition for dissolution of marriage in the San
Diego County Superior Court.' 6 Two years later, but prior to final
dissolution of the marriage, the debtor filed a voluntary petition
under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code.' 7 As of the date of the
filing of the Chapter 11 petition, the McCoys' community property
assets, which included the McCoys' residence, had not been
divided.'2
Upon motion by the debtor, the Bankruptcy Court entered an
order authorizing the private sale of the McCoys' residence.' 9 The
debtor, Mr. McCoy, requested that Mrs. McCoy receive, pursuant
to the requirements imposed by the Bankruptcy Code, her
community property share of the sale proceeds. 20 A dispute arose
between the McCoy's regarding the treatment of several debts
incurred by the debtor subsequent to separation from his wife but
prior to dissolution of their marriage. Mrs. McCoy argued that a
nondebtor spouse's community property may not be charged by the
debtor spouse's obligation incurred after separation, but prior to

13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.

See infra pages 131-132.
90 Bankr. 448 (S.D. Cal. 1988).
Id. at 448.
Id

Id
Id

Id.
Id.
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termination of the marriage." According to Mrs. McCoy, creditors
seeking to enforce postseparation debts should be limited to
satisfaction from the debtor spouse's separate property.'
The Bankruptcy Court disagreed with Mrs. McCoy and held
that former section 5120.110 of the California Civil Code permitted
debts incurred by a separated spouse to be satisfied from the
community estate.' The McCoy court reasoned that the statutory
scheme created by the California Legislature recognizes four
critical periods in determining the property rights of husband and
wife: (1) Premarriage;
(2) during marriage;
(3)
postseparation/predissolution (the "window-period"); and (4)
postdissolution. 24 According to the McCoy court, since a husband
and wife are legally married during the "window period," their
community property is liable for all debts incurred by either
spouse.'

The Court in McCoy distinguished American Olean Tile
Company v. Schultze,26 the only other case to date addressing
former section 5120.110.27 The defendants in American Olean,
Mr. and Mrs. Schultze, separated on April 1, 1980.28 On May 1,
1981, they executed a marital settlement agreement. 29 This

21. Id. at 450. Mrs. McCoy relied primarily on American Olean Tile Co. v. Schultze, 169 Cal.
App. 3d 359, 215 Cal. Rptr. 184 (1985), which held that "income earned and obligations incurred
after separation in the operation of a business are not community property in nature.- McCoy, 90
Bankr. at 450. (citing American Olean, 169 Cal. App. 3d 359, 365, 215 Cal. Rptr. 184, 187 (1985)).
22. McCoy, 90 Bankr. at 450.
23. Id. at 449. The court did point out, however, that former section 5120.110 provides an
exception to the rule in cases where an exception is statutorily created. For instance, the court
recognized that -[t]he earnings of a spouse before marriage... may not be held liable for a debt
incurred by the other spouse." 1aL (citing CAL. CiV. CODE § 5120.110(b)). The court also recognized
that "separate property of the nondebtor spouse is exempt from liability for premarital debts and
postseparation debts." Id. (citing CAL. CIV. CODE § 5120.130). The court, however, found these
exceptions inapplicable to the facts of McCoy. Id.
24. Id. Since only death or a final dissolution or nullity terminates marriage, it was formerly
held that neither an interlocutory judgment of dissolution, nor a legal separation will affect a party's
status as a spouse. See infra note 35 (noting authority which states that marriage terminates at final
dissolution).
25. McCoy, 90 Bankr. at 449.
26. 169 Cal. App. 3d 359, 215 Cal. Rptr. 184 (1985).
27. McCoy, 90 Bankr. at 450.
28. American Olean, 169 Cal. App. 3d at 363, 215 Cal. Rptr. at 186.
29. IdL
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agreement provided that the Schultzes' community property
business would be retained by Mr. Schultze as his separate
property.3" On May 6, 1981, prior to final dissolution of the
marriage, Mr. Schultze executed a promissory note in favor of the
plaintiff/creditor for unpaid invoices related to the business."
Subsequently, the plaintiff/creditor brought suit on the note and
sought to recover from Mrs. Schultze's community property for her
husband's postseparation debt.32 The First District Court of
Appeal rejected the creditor's argument and held that income
earned and obligationsincurred after separation in the operation of
a separate property business do not constitute community property
or community obligations.33 The McCoy court distinguished
American Olean as a case determining a creditor's rights
subsequent to the execution of a marital settlement agreement.34
Although it may seem unfair to permit debts incurred by a
separated spouse to be satisfied from the community estate, McCoy
appears to be a literally correct application of former section
5120.110. 35 Former section 5120.110 provides that community

30. Id
31. Id
32. Id
33. Id. at 364, 215 Cal. Rptr. at 187.
34. McCoy, 90 Bankr. at 450. The court in American Olean held that the wife's interest in
former community property was not liable for a debt incurred after separation and after the division
of community property by an interlocutory judgment of dissolution. American Olean, 169 Cal. App.
3d at 365, 215 Cal. Rptr. at 188. American Olean, therefore, was not decided on the basis of
California Civil Code section 5120.110, subdivision (c), but rather on the basis of Civil Code section
5120.160, subdivision (a) which renders separate and community property held by the nondebtor
spouse not subject to enforcement of debts incurred by the other spouse unless the nondebtorspouse
was assignedthe debt in the division of the property. See id. Thus, section 5120.160, which was at
issue in American Olean, applies after the division of community property, not after separation. CAL.
Cr. CODE § 5120.160(a)(1)-(3) (West Supp. 1991).
35. A leading treatise on California family law observes that "marriage continues until the
date that the marital status is terminated, not the date that spouses separate." 1 MARKEY, CALIFORNIA
FAmLY LAW PRACTICE AND PoRocupRE, 5-104 (1989). See Head v. Crawford, 156 Cal. App. 3d
11, 17-18, 202 Cal. Rptr. 534, 538 (1984). The court in Head stated:
Juda reminds us that she and Tracy were separated when Tracy encumbered the property.
She would have this court read Civil Code section 5127 as narrowly as possible so as to
preclude encumbrances of any interest of community real property made without mutual
knowledge and consent of the spouses when they are separated at the time the subject
property is encumbered. This, however, is not the rule. Final dissolution of the marriage
is the relevant date, not the time of separation: A marriage exists until final dissolution.
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property is liable for a debt incurred by either spouse "during
marriage." Thus, so long as two people were legally married in
California, it was appropriate for the court, pursuant to former
section 5120.110, to render the community liable for obligations
incurred by either spouse during separation."
II.

LEGAL IMPLICATIONS OF CALIFORNIA CIVIL

CODE SECTION 5120.110(c).

A. Community Liabilityfor Debts IncurredAfter January 1, 1990
Although newly enacted Civil Code section 5120.110(c) does
not specify an effective date for the amendment, California
Government Code section 9600(a) provides that a statute enacted
at a regular session of the legislature, as this one was, shall go into
effect January 1, following a 90 day period from the date of

enactment.3 7 Thus, the effective date for section 5120.110(c) is
January 1, 1990.
Section 5120.110(c) defines "during marriage" as not including

a period of spousal separation.3 8 Assuming, therefore, that Wife's
Las Vegas debts, as described in the introductory hypothetical,
were incurred after January 1, 1990, the court in the hypothetical
erred by holding the entire community liable for Wife's
postseparation debts. Subdivision (c) of section 5120.110 makes it

Since the community is liable for debts arising during the marriage, the community
property may still be liable for debts occurring after separation. [Citations omitted].
Although the non-consenting spouse may clear one-half of the community real property
from the lien, the community property of each may still be liable for community debts if
the creditor seeks to pursue the usual creditor's remedies. [Citation omitted].
Id. (emphasis in original).
36. As discussed below, however, the case law in California appears to create an exception
to the rule that community property is liable for debts incurred by either spouse "during marriage"
in situations where the debts in question involve loans received after separation. See infra notes 101107 and accompanying text.
37. CAL. Gov'T CODE § 9600(a) (West 1980).
38. CAL. Civ. CODE § 5120.1 10(a) and (c) (West Supp. 1991). For the complete text of former
section 5120.110 see supra note 3.
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clear that "during marriage" does not include the time between
separation and dissolution. 9
Section 5120.110(c) limits creditors to satisfaction from the
separate property of the debtor spouse.' In the absence of
disposition of the property by contract between the parties, some
creditors are prohibited from collecting upon the entire community
property as a means of satisfying the postseparation debts of either
spouse. Attorneys representing creditors should be mindful of this
legislative clarification in the area of spousal debts and advise their
clients accordingly. For instance, attorneys with creditor-clients
who insist on having the debtor's entire community estate available
for execution on the postseparation debt should advise their client
to refrain from entering into any future contractual arrangements
with a husband or wife without first obtaining the signature of both
spouses. By obtaining both spouse's signatures on the contract, the
creditor will avoid the risk of not having the community estate
available for execution upon the postseparation debts."

39. See supra note I and accompanying text (discussing section 5120.110(c) of the Civil
Code). See also In re McCoy, 111 Bankr. 276 (Bankr. 9h Cir. 1990) (stating that "'by amending
[section] 5120.110 the State Legislature has clearly mandated that a separated spouse's share of the
community property will not be reachable to satisfy the other spouse's postseparation debts"). It is
important to note, however, that this discussion is limited to postseparation debts. The treatment of
postseparation loansis discussed in a subsequent section of this Article. See infra notes 101-107 and
accompanying text.
40. CAL CIV. CODE § 5120.110(c) (West Supp. 1991). As examined below, however, there
is an exception to this rule in debt situations where a loan obtained is "related to the community"
or when a loan "benefits" the community estate. See In re Marriage of Stephenson, 162 Cal. App.
3d 1057, 1085, 209 Cal. Rptr. 383, 401 (1984). See, e.g., In re Marriage of Hopkins, 74 Cal. App.
3d 591,600, 141 Cal. Rptr. 597,602 (1977); In re Marriage of Munguia, 146 Cal. App. 3d 853, 862,
195 Cal. Rptr. 199, 203 (1983); In re Marriage of Lister, 152 Cal. App. 3d 411, 419, 199 Cal. Rptr.
321,326 (1984) (discussing the loan exception). See also infra notes 103-124 and accompanying text.
41. See Kennedy v. Taylor, 155 Cal. App. 3d 126, 130, 201 Cal. Rptr. 779, 781 (1984)
(holding in a related situation that "third party creditors can easily avoid the risk ...by obtaining
both spouses* signatures on notes."). According to the court: "[O]btaining both spouses' signatures
is a reasonable burden to place on creditors who later attempt to recover against former community
assets." Id.
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B. Community Liability for Debts Incurred Prior to January 1,
1990
Assume for purposes of this section that Wife's Las Vegas
debts, as described in the introductory hypothetical, were incurred
prior to the effective date of section 5120.110(c), and that Wife's
creditors, relying upon former section 5120.110, sought
enforcement of the debts from Husband's community assets.
Assume further, however, that unlike the result in the introductory
hypothetical, the court in this case held that the community estate
was not liable for Wife's postseparation debts based upon section
5120.110(c). Since such a ruling involves the retroactive
application of Civil Code section 5120.110(c), two questions arise:
(1) Whether section 5120.110(c) requires retroactive application;
and (2) whether such retroactive application constitutes an
unconstitutional deprivation of Husband's property.42 It is to the
merit of the hypothetical court's decision that this Article now
turns.
C. Retroactive Application of California Civil Code Section
5120.110(c)
1. Intent of retroactive application
A retroactive law is one which attaches a different legal effect
to preenactment conduct than that which would apply without the
passage of the statute.43 Such retroactive operation of a statute,

42. See In re Marriage of Bouquet, 16 Cal. 3d 583,586,546 P.2d 1371, 1372, 128 Cal. Rptr.
427, 428 (1976) (holding that when faced with the question of whether amended Civil Code section
5118 governs property acquired prior to the effective date of the amendment, the court must
determine whether "the amendment, properly construed, requires retroactive application and
[whether] such application does not constitute an unconstitutional deprivation of the Wife's
property"). See also Evangelatos v. Superior Court, 44 Cal. 3d 1188, 1225, 753 P.2d 585, 609-610,
246 Cal. Rptr. 629, 653-54 (1988) (declining to apply the Fair Responsibility Act of 1986
("Proposition 51") retroactively).
43. Hochman, The Supreme Court and the Constitutionality of Retroactive Legislation, 73
HARv. L. Rnv. 692, 692 (1960) (exploring the Supreme Court's approach to constitutional issues
inherent in legislation affecting existing rights). See Aetna Cas. & Surety Co. v. Indus. Accident
Comm'n, 30 Cal. 2d 388, 391, 182 P.2d 159, 160 (1947), stating that "[a] retrospective law is one
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however, is presumed to take effect only if it is clear that such was
the intent of the legislature.' This presumption is embodied in
section 3 of the California Civil Code which declares that "[n]o45
part of [this Code] is retroactive, unless expressly so declared."
Section 3, however, does not limit the search for an express
declaration of legislative intent solely to the statutory language."
Rather, in the absence of express language, the presumption is
applied only if "after considering all pertinent factors, it is
determined that it is impossible to ascertain the legislative
intent."' a Factors pertinent to a showing that the legislature
intended the statute to operate retroactively include the "context of
the legislation, its objective, the evils to be remedied, the history
same subject, public policy,
of the times and of legislation upon the
' 48
construction.
and contemporaneous
For instance, in In re Marriage of Bouquet,49 the California
Supreme Court faced the issue of whether amended Civil Code
section 5118 governs property rights acquired prior to the effective

which affects rights, obligations, acts, transactions and conditions which are performed or exist prior
to the adoption of the statute") (quoting American States Water Serv. Co. v. Johnson, 31 Cal. App.
2d 606, 613, 88 P.2d 770, 774 (1939)).
44. Evangelatos v. Superior Court, 44 Cal. 3d 1188, 1207, 753 P.2d 585, 596-97, 246 Cal.
Rptr. 629, 640 (1988) (citing Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. Indus. Accident Comm'n, 30 Cal. 2d
388, 393, 182 P.2d 159, 161 (1947)). See generally, 7 WrrKIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW,
CONSTITnTONAL LAw § 495 (9th ed. 1988).
45. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3 (West 1982). See In re Marriage of Bouquet, 16 Cal. 3d 583, 587
n.3, 546 P.2d 1371, 1372 n.3, 128 Cal. Rptr. 427, 428 n.3 (1976) (recognizing that "[s]ection 3 of
the Civil Code embodies the common law presumption against retroactivity").
46. See, e.g., United States v. Industrial Bank, 459 U.S. 70, 79-80 (1982); Aetna Cas. &
Surety Co. v. Industrial Ace. Co., 30 Cal. 2d 388, 182 P.2d 159 (1947); White v. Western Title Ins.
Co., 40 Cal. 3d 870, 884, 710 P.2d 309, 221 Cal. Rptr. 509, (1985); Glavinich v. Commonwealth
Land Title Ins. Co., 163 Cal. App. 3d 263, 272, 209 Cal. Rptr. 266, (1984) (holding that the court
may look beyond the express statutory language to determine legislative intent, but that it must be
clear that it was the legislative intent for the statute to be given retrospective application).
47. Bouquet, 16 Cal. 3d at 587, 546 P.2d at 1372-73, 128 Cal. Rptr. at 428 (citing In re
Estrada, 63 Cal. 2d 740, 746, 408 P.2d 948, 952, 48 Cal. Rptr. 172, 176 (1965)). The court in
Bouquet explained that "'[t]he rule of construction... is not a straightjacket. Where the legislature
has not set forth in so many words what it intended, the rule of construction should not be followed
blindly in complete disregard of factors that may give a clue to the legislative intent." Id.
48. Fox v. Alexis, 38 Cal. 3d 621, 629, 699 P.2d 309, 313-14, 214 Cal. Rptr. 132, 136-37
(1985). See Bouquet, 16 Cal. 3d at 587, 546 P.2d at 1372-73, 128 Cal. Rptr. at 428-29 (1976).
49. 16 Cal. 3d 583, 546 P.2d 1371, 128 Cal. Rptr. 427 (1976).
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date of the amendment.5" Finding the amendment silent as to
retroactivity, the court engaged an analysis of "pertinent factors"
supporting the inference that amended section 5118 was intended
by the legislature to apply retroactively."' One factor principally
relied upon by the court was the "patent unconstitutionality" of
the former statute.52 For instance, prior to the amendment, section
5118 discriminated against the husband during separation by
providing that the earnings of the wife were her separate property,
yet those of the husband belonged to the community. 53 Further,
the court largely relied upon a letter from the author of the
amendment indicating an intent that the amended statute be applied
retroactively.54
The pertinent factors relevant to a determination of legislative
intent mandate retroactive application of section 5120.110(c). It
must be assumed that the California Legislature, in enacting section
5120.110(c), was aware of the existing laws.55 Thus, it may

50. Id at 587, 546 P.2d at 1372, 128 Cal. Rptr. at 428.
51. Id. at 587-91, 546 P.2d at 1372-76, 128 Cal. Rptr. at 428-31.
52. Id at 588, 546 P.2d at 1373-74, 128 Cal. Rptr. at 429-30. The unconstitutionality of the
former law indicates, according to the court in Bouquet, that the legislature intended the amendment
to have retroactive effect. Id,The court qualified its holding in this regard, however, by stating that
the inference that a constitutionally infirm law indicates the legislature's intent to apply it
retroactively is "hardly conclusive." Id.
53. Id
54. Id,In the letter, Assemblyman Hayes expressed his opinion that section 5118 was intended
to operate retroactively. Id, at 588-89, 546 P.2d at 1374-75, 128 Cal. Rptr. at 430-31. In pertinent
part the letter read:
It was my intention as the author of AB 1549, and the argument I used in obtaining
passage of the measure by the Assembly and Senate of the California Legislature, that this
amendment to Section 5118 of the Civil Code ...would govern the determination of the
property rights of the parties under the same rules applied by the California Supreme
Court case of Addison v. Addison ....The intention was to supersede the prior law and
to have the new law retroactively apply to all cases decided on and after March 4, 1972.
Id. The court construed the letter as indicative of legislative intent. Id at 590, 546 P.2d at 1374-75,
128 Cal. Rptr. at 430-31. No such letters of legislative intent exist in relation to section 5120.110(c).
55. See In re Misener, 38 Cal. 3d 543, 552, 698 P.2d 637, 643, 213 Cal. Rptr. 569, 575
(1985); Harris v. Alcoholic Beverage Control Appeals Bd., 197 Cal. App. 2d 759,767, 18 Cal. Rptr.
151, 156 (1961) (stating that courts may assume that the legislature in enacting a statute knew the
existing law).

118

1991 / Civil Code Section 5120.110(c)
further be assumed that the legislature intended section 5120.110(c)
to be subject to Civil Code sections 5120.3 10 and 5120.320, which
together provide that:
the provisions of [chapter 3 of title 8 of the Civil Code, of which
section 5120.110 and sections 5120.310 and 5120.320 are a part] govern
the liability of separate and community property and the personal

liability of a married person for a debt enforced on or after... [January
1, 1985], regardless whether the debt was incurred before, on, or after
[January 1, 1985].6

Since the legislature did not amend sections 5120.310 and
5120.320 when it enacted section 5120.110(c), the legislature likely
intended new section 5120. 110(c) to apply to all debts enforced on
or after January 1, 1985. Quite simply, the legislature's failure to
indicate that section 5120.110(c) would not be subject to the
provisions of section 5120.320, takes the place of express language
of legislative intent and is at least as effective as such language in
evidencing an intent to give the amendment to section 5120.110
retroactive effect. Significantly, the United States Bankruptcy
Appellate Panel for the Ninth Circuit reached the same conclusion
the lower Bankruptcy
on February 26, 1990, when it5 reversed
7
McCoy.
re
In
in
decision
Court's
A finding that the legislature intended Civil Code section
5120.110(c) to apply retroactively, however, is merely one
prerequisite to retroactive application of a statute. After identifying
such an intent, the court must determine that retroactive application
of the statute is not barred by constitutional constraints.5"

56. CAL. CiV. CODE §§ 5120.310, 5120.320 (West Supp. 1991).
57. In re McCoy, 111 Bankr. 276, 281 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1990). Additionally, in at least one
superior court case the court also applied section 5120.110(c) retroactively pursuant to section
5120.320. Afaah Investment Co. v. Beverly Newport Aviation, L.A. Superior Court Case
No. C 683291. In fact, one of the authors of this article, S. Brett Sutton, was involved in the
representation of the defendant in that case.
58. In re Marriage of Buol, 39 Cal. 3d 751, 756, 705 P.2d 354, 356, 218 Cal. Rptr. 31, 34

(1985).
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2. Constitutionalityof retroactive application
California case law has long held that the retroactive
application of a statute may be unconstitutional if it deprives a
person of a vested59 property right without due process of law.6'
In fact, excluding decisions rendered during the last twenty-five
years, the California Supreme Court has consistently held that
community property legislation which impairs vested rights is per
se unconstitutional if applied retroactively.61 Once a vested right
was found, these courts proceeded directly to the conclusion that
the statute would be unconstitutional if applied retroactively.
A new standard for determining retroactive application was
announced in 1965. Largely motivated by academics commenting
on the topic, the California Supreme Court in Addison v.
Addison' adopted a constitutional doctrine which permits vested
rights to be impaired when there is a sufficiently important state
purpose for doing so. 63 The constitutional question, according to
the court in Addison, is not whether a vested right is impaired by
a marital property law change, but whether such a change
reasonably could be believed to be sufficiently necessary to the

59. The word "vested" is used here to describe property rights that are not subject to a
condition precedent. See In re Marriage of Bouquet, 16 Cal. 3d 583, 591 n.7, 546 P.2d 1371, 1376
n.7, 128 Cal. Rptr. 427, 432 n.7 (1976).
60. See In re Marriage of Buol, 39 Cal. 3d 751,756,705 P.2d 354, 357, 218 Cal. Rptr. 31,
34 (1985) (citing Rosefield Packing Co. v. Superior Court, 4 Cal. 2d 120, 122, 47 P.2d 716, 717
(1935); San Bernardino County v. Indus. Acc. Com., 217 Cal. 618, 628, 20 P.2d 673, 677 (1933);
In re Marriage of Bouquet, 16 Cal. 3d 583, 592, 128 P.2d 1371, 1376, 128 Cal. Rptr. 427, 432
(1976); Robertson v. Willis, 77 Cal. App. 3d 358, 365, 143 Cal. Rptr. 523, 527-28 (1978)).
61. Spreckels v. Spreckels, 116 Cal. 339, 349, 48 P. 228, 231 (1897). The line of cases
following Spreckels looked solely at the question of whether the right that would be impaired by the
proposed legislation was "vested.' See, e.g., Boyd v. Oser, 23 Cal. 2d 613, 619-21, 145 P.2d 312,
316-17 (1944); Trimble v. Trimble, 219 Cal. 340,346,26 P.2d 477,480 (1933); Stewart v. Stewart
(1),
199 Cal. 318, 340-41, 249 P. 197, 206-07 (1926); McKay v. Lauriston, 204 Cal. 557, 565, 269
P. 519, 522 (1928); Roberts v. Wehrneyer, 191 Cal. 601, 612, 218 P. 22, 26 (1923); Duncan v.
Duncan, 6 Cal. App. 404, 407, 92 P. 310, 311-12 (1907). See also Flagg, Respecting Reliance: A
Standard for Due Process Review of California's Retroactive Community Property Legislation,
COMMUNnrY PROP. J.,January 1988, at 14, 21-22 (arguing against following the California
retroactivity doctrine adopted in In Re Buol, 39 Cal. 3d 751,705 P.2d 354, 218 Cal. Rptr. 31 (1985),
and In re Fabian, 41 Cal. 3d 440, 715 P.2d 253, 224 Cal. Rptr. 333 (1986)).
62. 62 Cal. 2d 558, 399 P.2d 897, 43 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1965).
63. Id at 566, 399 P.2d at 902, 43 Cal. Rptr. at 102.
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public welfare as to justify the impairment." If such language is
deemed sufficiently necessary, then the statute will have retroactive
effect.
The first case to apply the Addison due process analysis of
retroactivity was In re Marriageof Bouquet.' The issue faced by
the California Supreme Court in Bouquet was whether amended

Civil Code section 5118,6 could be applied retroactively so as to
govern property rights acquired prior to the effective date of the
amendment.67 Under the former law, the earnings and
accumulations of the wife during separation constituted separate
property, but those of the husband were the property of the
community.68 Utilizing the Addison analysis, the court had little
trouble approving the retroactive application of the statute. The
Bouquet court reasoned that remedying past discrimination against
the husband during periods of separation justified the impairment
of the wife's vested property rights.6 9

64. Id. (quoting Armstrong, "Prospective" Application of Changes in Community Property
Control - Rule of Propertyor ConstitutionalNecessity?, 33 CAL. L. REv. 476, 495-96 (1945). The
court stated that vested rights may be impaired 'with due process of law' under many circumstances.
Id. The state's inherent sovereign power includes the so-called 'police power' right to interfere with
vested property rights whenever reasonably necessary to the protection of the health, safety, morals,
and general well being of the people. Id.
65. 16 Cal. 3d 583, 546 P.2d 1371, 128 Cal. Rptr. 427 (1976).
66. Section 5118, as amended in 1971, provides: "The earnings and accumulations of a
spouse and the minor children living with, or in the custody of the spouse, while living separate and
apart from the other spouse, are the separate property of the spouse." CA. CIV. CODE § 5118 (West
1983).
67. Bouquet, 16 Cal. 3d at 587, 546 P.2d at 1372, 128 Cal. Rptr. at 428.
68. Prior to the 1971 amendment, section 5118 read: "The earnings and accumulations of the
wife and her minor children living with her or in her custody, while she is living separate from her
husband, are the separate property of the wife." 1969 Cal. Stat. ch. 1608, sec. 8, at 3340 (enacting
CAL. Civ. CODE § 5118). Civil Code sections 5110 and 5119 rendered the husband's earnings
community property. Bouquet, 16 Cal. 3d at 586 n.2, 546 P.2d at 1372 n.2, 128 Cal. Rptr. at 428 n.2.
69. Bouquet, 16 Cal. 3d at 594,546 P.2d at 1377-78, 128 Cal. Rptr. at 433-34. In particular,
the court pointed to the "patent unfairness" of the former law. According to the court, "[t]he patent
unfairness of former section 5118 surely makes this an appropriate case for the use of the police
power to redress retroactively inequitable property rules. Besides augmenting the state interest in
giving the new law effect as quickly as possible, the unfairness of the former law also casts doubt
upon the legitimacy of reliance upon it." Id. at 594,n. 11, 546 P.2d at 1377 n. 11, 128 Cal. Rptr. at
433 n. 1.
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The Bouquet court delineated a set of factors to be considered
in determining the constitutionality of legislation that infringes
upon vested rights.7" These factors include:
[Tihe significance of the state interest served by the law, the importance

of the retroactive application of the law to the effectuation of that
interest, the extent of reliance upon the former law, the legitimacy of
that reliance, the extent of actions taken on the basis of that reliance,
and the extent to which7 1the retroactive application of the new law would
disrupt those actions.

Unfortunately, the Bouquet court sustained the retroactive
application of amended section 5118 without a substantial
discussion of the newly enunciated factors. The court simply
concluded that the "state's interest in the equitable dissolution of
the marital relationship supports [the] use of the police power to
abrogate rights in marital property that derived from the patently
unfair prior law." 72 Thus, although the court in Bouquet seems to
advocate a new test for determining the constitutionality of
legislation that impairs vested rights, it actually provides future
courts with little guidance in applying the Bouquet factors.
The California Supreme Court has virtually ignored the balance
of factors set forth in Bouquet and instead created a rule which
suggests that "only a state interest in rectifying a former injustice
would justify retroactive application of community property
law." 73 Leading the way for such a rule is the supreme court's

70. Id. at 592, 546 P.2d at 1376, 128 Cal. Rptr. at 432.
71. Id
72. Id. at 594, 546 P.2d at 1378, 128 Cal. Rptr. at 434.
73. See Flagg, supra note 61, at 14, 15. William A. Reepy, in an article written only months
after Flagg's article, describes as "alarmists" Flagg and the court decisions that also interpret the law
surrounding the retroactive application of community property legislation as constitutional only if the
law to be superseded was causing some form of "rank injustice." Reepy, Applying New Law At
Divorce To PreenactmentAcquisitions: Must PriorLaw Be "Rankly Unjust"?, COMMUNITY PROP.
J., Oct. 1988, at 1. According to Reepy, "to the extent such a rule emerges from these opinions, it
is dictum." Id.
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1985 decision, In re Marriageof Buol,74 and its 1986 ruling in In
75
re Marriageof Fabian.
In Buol, the husband and wife married in 1943 and separated
in 1977.76 The Wife began working in 1954 as a housekeeper,
babysitter, and an attendant to an elderly woman. 7 In 1959, she
began working as a nursing attendant at a local hospital. 78 Wife
purchased the family residence with earnings from her employment
which she kept in a separate bank account. 79 Title to the property
was taken in joint tenancy with the husband. 0 ,
The sole issue in Buol was the status of the home as separate
or community property." The court awarded the home to the
wife, holding that the parties had an enforceable oral agreement
that the earnings and the home were the wife's separate
property. 2 The Husband appealed this decision.
During the pendency of the appeal, Civil Code section 4800.1
was enacted." Section 4800.1 provides that the only means of

74. 39 Cal. 3d 751,705 P.2d 354, 218 Cal. Rptr. 31 (1985) superseded by CAL. CIV. CODE
§§ 4800.1, 4800.2 (West Supp. 1991).
75. 41 Cal. 3d 440,715 P.2d 253,224 Cal. Rptr. 333 (1986) superseded by CAL. Civi CODE
§ 4800.2 (West Supp. 1991).
76. Buol, 39 Cal. 3d at 754, 705 P.2d at 355, 218 Cal. Rptr. at 32.
77. Id.
78. Id
79. Id. at 754-55, 705 P.2d at 355-56, 218 Cal. Rptr. at 32. The separate account was
established with husband's knowledge and consent. Id,
80. Id.
81. Id
82. Id. at 755,705 P.2d at 356,218 Cal. Rptr. at 33. Prior to the enactment of California Civil
Code section 4800.1, property acquired during marriage in joint tenancy was presumed to be
community property. 1979 Cal. Stat. ch. 373, see. 48, at 1264 (amending CAL Ctv. CODE § 5110).
This presumption, however, could be rebutted by oral agreement that the property was the separate
property of one spouse. See In re Marriage of Lucas, 27 Cal. 3d 808, 814-15, 614 P.2d 285,288-89,
166 Cal. Rptr. 853, 857 (1980) (asserting that this presumption could be rebuffed by oral agreement
that the property was the separate property of one spouse).
83. Section 4800.1(b) provides:
For the purpose of division of property upon dissolution of marriage or legal separation,
property acquired by the parties during marriage in joint tenancy form ... is presumed to be
community property. This presumption is a presumption affecting the burden of proof and may
be rebutted by either of the following:
(1) A clear statement in the deed or other documentary evidence of title by which
the property is acquired that the property is separate property and not community
property.
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rebutting the presumption that property acquired in joint tenancy
during marriage is community property is by providing evidence of
a written agreement that the property is the separate property of
one spouse.84 No such writing existed in the Buol case. 5
The California Supreme Court affirmed, holding that section
4800.1 may not constitutionally be applied retroactively since doing
so would impair vested property rights of the husband without due
process of law.86 According to the court, the state's interest in the
equitable dissolution of marital property upon dissolution of
marriage was insufficient to deprive a spouse of a vested property
interest which prior to the passage of the new law had been
considered separate property. 7 The court distinguished Bouquet
as a case where retroactive application was necessary to subserve
the sufficiently important state interest of correcting an injustice
created by the former law.88 Finding no such compelling reason
present, the Buol court denied retroactive application of section
4800.1.89
The California Supreme Court also denied retroactive
application of Civil Code section 4800.2 in In re Marriage of
Fabian.'° The Fabians married in 1972 and separated in 1979. 92'
In 1982, an interlocutory judgment of dissolution was entered.
In its findings of fact and conclusions of law, the court found that
a motel and its income constituted community property of the
marriage.93 The court also found that Mr. Fabian had contributed

(2) Proof that the parties have made a written agreement that the property is
separate property.
CQU. CIv. CODE § 4800.1(b) (West Supp. 1991).
84. Id.
85. See Buol, 39 Cal. 3d at 755, 705 P.2d at 356, 218 Cal. Rptr. at 33.
86. Id at 763-65, 705 P.2d at 362,218 Cal. Rptr. at 39. At the time of trial, wife had a vested
property interest in the residence as her separate property. Id

87. Id
88. Id at761,705 P.2d at 360, 218 Cal. Rptr. at37 (citing In re Marriage of Bouquet, 16 Cal.
3d, 583, 593, 546 P.2d, 1371, 128 Cal. Rptr. 427, 247 (1976)).
89. Id. at 761, 705 P.2d at 360, 218 Cal. Rptr. at 37.
90. 41 Cal. 3d 440, 715 P.2d 253, 224 Cal. Rptr. 333 (1986).
91. Id at 443, 715 P.2d at 254, 224 Cal. Rptr. at 334.
92. Id.
93. Id.
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$275,000 received from his separate property into the motel prior
to separation, but that there was no promise or agreement providing
that Mr. Fabian should receive reimbursement or repayment of any
of the contributed money.94 According to the trial court, Mr.
Fabian made a gift of separate funds to the community asset.9"
The court's judgment in favor of Mrs. Fabian reflected this
fimding.%
During the pendency of Mr. Fabian's appeal, Civil Code section
4800.2 was enacted, providing that separate property contributions
to community assets are to be reimbursed on dissolution, unless the
spouse making the contribution has expressly waived the right to
reimbursement in writing. 97 This section is in direct contravention
of prior statutory law which deemed separate property contributions
to community assets as gifts to the. community. Thus, had the
Supreme Court applied section 4800.2 retroactively, Mrs. Fabian's
share in the motel would have been decreased by the amount Mr.
Fabian would be entitled to in reimbursement for his $275,000
separate property contribution. Such a ruling, therefore, would
operate to impair Mrs. Fabian's vested property interest.
In denying retroactive application of section 4800.2, the court
in Fabianemployed similar reasoning as was used by the court in
Buol. After determining that the trial court was correct in its
characterization of the motel and Mr. Fabian's separate property
contribution as community property, the court held that there is not
a sufficiently significant state interest to mandate retroactive
94. Id
95. Id
96. Id.
97. CAL. CIV. CODE § 4800.2 (West Supp. 1987). Section 4800.2 provides:
In the division of property under this part unless a party has made a written waiver of the
right to reimbursement or signed a writing that has the effect of a waiver, the party shall
be reimbursed for his or her contribution to the acquisition of the property to the extent
the party traces the contribution to a separate property source. The amount reimbursed
shall be without interest or adjustment for change in monetary values and shall not exceed
the net value of the property at the time of the division. As used in this section,
contributions to the acquisition of the property include down payments, payments for
improvements, and payments that reduce the principal of a loan used to finance the
purchase or improvement of the property but do not include payments of interest on the
loan or payments made for maintenance, insurance, or taxation of the property.

Id
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application of section 4800.2.9 According to the court, the state's
interest in creating a law which aids in the division of marital
property does not rise to the same level as the prevention of the
"rank injustice" identified in Bouquet."
In re Marriage of Buol, and its 1986 companion case, In re
Marriage of Fabian, create a standard whereby retroactive
application of community property legislation is constitutional only
where a state interest in remedying an injustice in the former law
is present. Accordingly, only if amended section 5120.110(c)
operates to remedy a prior injustice, such as that found by the
Bouquet court to exist in former Civil Code section 5118, will
retroactive application be deemed constitutional."
Amended section 5120.110(c) of the California Civil Code
provides the courts with an easy and clear method of distributing
marital property upon dissolution of marriage."10 Thus, like Civil
Code sections 4800.1 and 4800.2 as discussed in Buol and Fabian,
amended section 5120.110(c) also serves the state's generalized
interest in the equitable dissolution of the marital relationship.
Unlike sections 4800.1 and 4800.2, however, amended section
5120.110(c) also serves the state's interest in remedying an
injustice in the former law which makes one spouse's community
property interest liable for the postseparation debts of the other
spouse, when the one spouse has no control over the other spouse's
incurring of debts and the debts are not incurred for the benefit of

98.

Fabian,41 Cal. 3d at 449, 715 P.2d at 258-59, 224 Cal. Rptr. at 338-39 (1986).

99. ld According to the court, -[a]bsent patent unfairness in the former law, retroactivity of
section 48002 is wholly unnecessary." Id
100. This new standard for due process review of retroactive legislation has been applied in
several appellate courts since Buol and Fabian.See, e.g., In re Marriage of Taylor, 189 Cal. App.
3d 435, 442, 234 Cal. Rptr. 486, 490-91 (1987); In re Marriage of Slivka, 183 Cal. App. 3d 159,
164-68, 228 Cal. Rptr. 76, 78-81 (1986); In re Marriage of Howard, 184 Cal. App. 3d 1, 6-9, 228
CaL Rptr. 813, 815-17 (1986). See also Reepy, supra note 61, at 14 (arguing that Buol and Fabian,
and cases construing Buol and Fabian, holding that retroactive application of new community
property legislation are constitutional only if the prior law is "rankly unjust", is mere dictum). But
see Flagg, supra note 73, at 14 (arguing against following the California retroactivity doctrine
adopted in Buol and Fabian).
101. See CAL. CIv. CODE § 5120.110(c) (West Supp. 1991) (providing that the period during
which spouses are living separate and apart prior to dissolution of marriage or legal separation is not
considered to be "during marriage").
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the community. Precisely as in Bouquet, therefore, retroactive
application of amended section 5120.110(c) is constitutional not
only because it serves the state's interest in supervising marital
property and dissolutions, but also because the amendment serves
the states interest in rectifying the injustice created by former
section 5120.110.
I.

THE FAILED SYMMETRY: A DISREGARD FOR

CALIFORNIA PRECEDENT AND THE "RELATEDNESS" TEST
Prior to 1990, the laws in California pertaining to
postseparation debts and postseparation earnings and accumulations
were inconsistent. Although Civil Code section 5118 permitted a
separated spouse to retain those earnings and accumulations
acquired during separation as his or her separate property, Civil
Code section 5120.110 rendered the community liable for
obligations incurred by either spouse during the same period. The
legislature, therefore, enacted section 5120.110(c) with one
objective in mind: to eliminate the inequity inherent in a system
which makes a spouse's community property liable for the other
spouse's postseparation debts,102 yet denies the nondebtor spouse
any interest in the other spouse's postseparation earnings and
accumulations. 0 3 The legislature was convinced that this goal
could only be realized by legislation which would bring former
Civil Code section 5120.110 into symmetry with Civil Code section
5118. Unfortunately, the legislature may have failed to achieve this
intended result.

102.
103.

See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
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A. PostseparationLoans: An Exception to Civil Code Section 5118
California Civil Code section 5118, which renders the earnings
and accumulations of a separated spouse as the separate property
of the spouse, has been interpreted broadly to include virtually any
acquired by a spouse after
earning 10 or accumulation"
separation. The proceeds of a postseparation loan, however, are not
the separate property of the acquiring spouse. An exception to
section 5118 exists where proceeds are deemed related to the
community, and therefore outside the scope of Civil Code section
5118.'06
California's Second District Court of Appeal applied this
"relatedness" exception to Civil Code section 5118 in In re
Marriage of Stephenson.1 "7 In Stephenson, Husband, two years
after separation, purchased land with loan funds obtained by
borrowing from his pension plan."0 8 Reasoning that the pension
plan was comprised largely of community property, the court
deemed the loan proceeds sufficiently related to the community so
as not to be a postseparation accumulation within the meaning of
section 5118.109 According to the court, the proceeds of a
postseparation loan will be deemed the separate property of the
borrowing spouse only if it is not obtained in exchange for

104.

See In re Marriage of Imperato, 45 Cal. App. 3d 432,438, 119 Cal. Rptr. 590,594 (1975)

(stating that earnings are broader in scope than wages and salary). Earnings can encompass income
derived from carrying on a business as a sole proprietor where the earnings are the fruit or award for
labor and services without the aid of capital. d
105. See Union Oil Co. v. Stewart, 158 Cal. 149, 156, 110 P. 313,316 (1910). Accumulations
have been interpreted by the California Supreme Court as "any property which a person acquires and
retains ...[except if the property is] ... acquired by ...[a] purchase with community funds, or in
exchange for other community property." Id See also Richardson v. Superior Court, 101 Cal. App.
638, 644,281 P. 1077, 1080 (1929), In re Marriage of Wall, 29 Cal. App. 3d 76,79, 105 Cal. Rptr.
201, 202-03 (1972) (interpreting the definition of accumulations).
106. See In re Marriage of Stephenson, 162 Cal. App. 3d 1057, 1085,209 Cal. Rptr. 383,401

(1984) (providing that the proceeds of a postseparation loan will be the separate property of the
borrowing spouse if it is not obtained in exchange for community property and is, therefore, unrelated
to the community).
107.
108.
109.

Id. at 1085, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 401.
Id at 1084, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 401.
Id. at 1085, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 401.
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community property and is, therefore, unrelated to the
community. 1 ' Although property purchased by a spouse while
living separate and apart from the other spouse may be regarded as
an accumulation, the source of the funds used in making the
purchase, rather than the fact that the property is acquired during
separation, is the controlling factor in determining the
characterization of property as separate or community.
B. The Relatedness Test and Similar Treatment Under Civil Code
Section 5120.110
A creditor's ability to satisfy outstanding debts from the
community has also been limited in loan situations. In fact, prior
to the enactment of section 5120.110(c), the courts in California
uniformly held the borrowing spouse solely liable for
postseparation loans unrelated to the community.
For instance, in In re Marriage of Hopkins,"' Husband and
Wife separated after 34 years of marriage.1 2 Wife incurred
various obligations after separation, mainly constituting
miscellaneous department store charges." 3 Although Civil Code
section 5116, the then existing statute applicable to postseparation
debts of a spouse, rendered the community liable for debts incurred
during marriage, the Hopkins court limited the reach of the statute
such that the community is absolved of any liability for
postseparation unrelated to the community.1 According to the
court, because earnings and accumulations of each spouse after
separation are deemed the separate property of that spouse there is
no reason to hold that postseparation debts which are unrelated to
the community should not be characterized as separate."' Finding

110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.

Id
74 Cal. App. 3d 591, 141 Cal. Rptr. 597 (1977).
Id at 595-96, 141 Cal. Rptr. at 599.
Id at 600, 141 Cal. Rptr. at 602.

Id
Id
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the department store charges unrelated to the community, the court
u6
therefore required the wife to pay her own postseparation bills.
The "relatedness" standard was also applied in In re Marriage
of Munguia.117 In Munguia, the First District Court of Appeal
reversed the trial court's holding that a debt for private investigator
services was a community debt, where after the parties separated,
Husband hired an investigator to locate his wife and two children
and return them to the United States." 8 The court held that since
the postseparation debt was unrelated to the community, it should
properly be considered a separate liability. 1 9
In re Marriage of Lister 20 was the next in the line of cases
applying the "relatedness" standard. Lister can be distinguished in
that it does not involve a creditor's ability to reach the community
for satisfaction, but rather deals with the debtor's ability to use
funds from a loan on community property to repay his separate
obligation.'
Nevertheless, the court's reasoning in Lister is
sound and instructive. Citing Hopkins," the court in Lister
affirmed the trial court's decision ordering the husband to
reimburse the community for property used to satisfy his
postseparation debts."z According to the court, just as a
husband's earnings while separate are his separate property, so too
are debts he incurred after separation which were not related to the
24
community.1
The most recent postseparation loan case is American Olean
Tile Co. v. Schultze." The plaintiff/creditor in American Olean
was not permitted to use the nondebtor spouse's community
property to satisfy obligations incurred by the other spouse in the

116. Id
117. 146 Cal. App. 3d 853, 195 Cal. Rptr. 199 (1983).
118. IR at 861-62, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 203.
119. Id. at 862, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 203.
120. 152 Cal. App. 3d 411, 199 Cal. Rptr. 321 (1984).
121. Id. at 415-16, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 323-24. See supra and infra notes 111-127 and
accompanying text (discussing the apparent exception to 5120.110 in loan situations.)
122. See supra notes 111-116 and accompanying text (discussing In re Marriage of Hopkins).
123. Lister, 152 Cal. App. 3d at 419, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 326.
124. Id
125. 169 Cal App. 3d 359, 215 Cal. Rptr. 184 (1985).
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operation of a separate property business. 26 The court reasoned
that because postseparation earnings and accumulations are the
separate property of the acquiring spouse, debts incurred after
separation should also be so construed because such debts are
unrelated to the conmnunity. 127
Based upon the foregoing case law, it is clear that the
California Legislature has gone further than necessary in its attempt
to bring the laws pertaining to postseparation debts into symmetry
with the laws pertaining to postseparation earnings and
accumulations. California has created an exception to the general
rules governing postseparation debts and accumulations where a
loan is concerned," however the legislature could have created
the intended symmetry without absolving the entire community
from liability for postseparation debts. The case law clearly
illustrates that this symmetry could have been achieved through a
less encompassing amendment which excepts from liability only
those postseparation debts which are unrelated to the community.
By doing so, section 5120.110 would conform not only with
section 5118, but also with the judicial interpretation of both
statutes in loan situations.
IV. PROPOSAL
The following proposal calls for an amendment to both Civil
Code section 5120.110(c) and Civil Code section 5118. The intent
of the proposal is (1) to create the symmetry intended by the
legislature when it enacted section 5120.110(c), and (2) to clarify
Civil Code section 5120.110 and 5118 so that spouse's and their
creditors can easily understand their rights and obligations.

126.
127.
128.

Id at 364, 215 Cal. Rptr. at 187 (citing CAL. CIv. CODE § 5118 (West 1983)).
Id.
See supra notes 111-127 and accompanying text.
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A. Civil Code Section 5118
Section 5118 should remain in its present form except for the
addition of a provision defining the term "accumulation." The
amendment should read:
(b) An

"accumulation"

within

this section

includes any

property which a person acquires and retains except where the
property is acquired by a purchase with community funds, or

in exchange for other community property.

The addition of subdivision (b) to section 5118 clarifies that
postseparation accumulations are not always per se separate
property of the acquiring spouse. Rather, if the property is either
(1) acquired by a purchase with community funds, or (2) acquired
in exchange for other community property, it will be deemed by
the court to be community property. This amendment not only
brings the statute into accord with California case law applying the
"relatedness" standard, but it clarifies the rights of each spouse in
relation to property acquired in a postseparation setting.
B. Civil Code Section 5120.110(c)
Section 5120.110(c) should be amended so that it creates the
symmetry intended by its authors. The proposed amendment should
read:
(c) For debts incurred during separation, community property

is only liable for those debts which are related to the
community. Debts incurred during this period which do not
relate to the community are the separate debt of the debtor
spouse.

This proposed amendment leaves Civil Code section 5120.110(c)
virtually unchanged, except the community will remain liable for
postseparation loans related to the community. Such an amendment
is not only consistent with Civil Code section 5118, but gives
effect to the courts' treatment of the Civil Code provisions in
California.
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CONCLUSION

The laws in California, prior to January 1, 1990, failed to
distinguish between spousal liability for debts incurred prior to and
subsequent to separation. The result was a statutory system which
permitted the community to suffer the risks of liability without the
corresponding benefits derived from such risks. Cognizant that the
inequities inherent in such a system could only be remedied by
legislation which creates symmetry among those laws pertaining to
the division of marital property, the Legislature in California
enacted Civil Code section 5120.110(c). The legislature believed
that section 5120.110(c), which absolves a nondebtor spouse's
share in the community from liability for the postseparation
obligation incurred by the spouse, would create the symmetry
necessary to bring about equitable results.
Unfortunately, the legislature's efforts in this regard may have
gone too far. California has consistently considered proceeds of a
spouse's postseparation loan to be community in nature if it relates
to the community. Thus, in order to create complete symmetry
between section 5118 and section 5120.110, California simply had
to enact legislation which renders the community liable only if (1)
the debt incurred stems from the existence of unsatisfied loan, and
(2) if the unsatisfied loan relates to the community. Doing so
would, at last, create the complete symmetry necessary to bring
about equitable results under all circumstances.
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